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Love of God and Unity of Wisdom in Plato and
Leibniz
Dr Tinu Ruparell
University of Calgary
IN what follows I wish to consider the following
question, the relevance of which should be fairly
obvious for a discussion on the love of God:
does love flow from wisdom or wisdom flow
from love?! The question is at the heart of much
Christian reflection on the nature of the love of
God and how it is to be known. Augustine·
famously reflects on the source of his knowledge
and love of God in book X of his Confessions
where he concludes that God is truly within him
and has always been SO.2 Only in and after
recognition of this fact is love engendered. In a
different vein, Ignatius of Antioch wrote to the
Ephesian church that their faith "was the means
by which [they] ascended, and [their] love the
way which led up to God,,,3 and Ambrose, in his
Letter to Simplician, suggests. that the love of
God in Christ is. reflected in the sacrifice of
Christ for the inchoate body, that is the Church.
The wise, he goes on, are thus not afraid to be
under bondage to Christ through service in the
church, since this bondage is in reality freedom
and service the gateway to making real the love
of God. So Ambrose and Ignatius, contrary to
Augustine, appear to privilege faithful
commitment and unity (love) over knowledge
(wisdom). But again the contrary side reappears
with Pope Benedict in his first Christmas
Encyclical, where he wrote that the union of
God and human beings, " ... is no mere fusion, a
sinking in the nameless ocean of the Divine; it is
a unity which creates love, a unity in which both
God and man remain themselves and yet become

fully' one. As SaintPaul says: 'He who is united
to the Lord becomes one spirit with him.'" (1
Cor 6: 17)4 Suffice it to say that the issue is by
no means settled.
Some light might be shed on the question
through considering two philosophers: the first
thoroughly· Christianised, the second (at least
nominally) Christian. 5 The relationship between
love and wisdom is key for both Plato and
Leibniz as each eventually arrives at a position
where some form of ontological unity is the
basis for salvific knowledge and, furthermore,
this unity is either had through love or is its font.
Love of God, for all each, intimately comlects
wisdom and unity. What I wish to do is to
clarify how each sees this connection. To begin
the analysis let us start with Plato.
Plato's discussion of love takes place
primar:ily through three dialogues: the Lysis, the
Symposium and the Phaedrus (though I shall
here concern myself primarily with the first
two). Through these dialogues we see Socrates
expound on the 'art of love' (ta erotica), which,
he memorably tells his fellow symposiasts, is the
sole thing he claims to know.
This rather
remarkable claim from Socrates is in itself
noteworthy since at his trial Socrates argues that
his· wisdom consists solely in the fact that he
realises that he knows nothing. 6 On the surface
then, Socrates' claim in the Symposium is
unique, possible contradictory and assuredly
important. As we shall see below, we are right
to pay particular attention to this statement since
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in Socrates' 'Diotima' speech we see the real
meaning behind his words, namely Platonism.
Tuming to the Lysis we see Socrates in
discussion with Hypothales on the subject of
how best to speak to the object of one's
affections in order to win him. Hypothales loves
Lysis and is quite literally constantly singing his
praises, recounting his many beauties and
virtues, listing his great deeds and those of his
ancestors, and generally pining for Lysis so
much that he is now becoming quite a bore to
those around him. Socrates chides Hypothales
for eulogising Lysis over-generously, since no
skilled lover would ever do so. For, as Socrates
teaches, if after you have placed the object of
your affections on such a high pedestal you
succeed in securing him, you have in fact only
succeeded in announcing your .own prowess at
winning such a prize. Those who are wise in
love, rather, only ever praise their beloved after
they have them since they fear what the future
may hold. (Lysis 206a) Praising your beloved
to the skies before you have some commitment
only makes your beloved big-headed and thus
less likely to accept you, or if they do accept
you, the flattery leaves them constantly second
,guessing themselves as to whether they made the
right choice or really could have done better.
So humbled, Hypothales enquires as to the
best way to speak to one's beloved, to which.
Socrates then offers a master class in the art of
questioning - elenctic - which is the real art of
love. When Socrates says that he knows the art
of love, Plato is making a play on words:
between the noun eros and the verb erotan
(meaning to question). So Socrates' prowess is .
not in the art of love understood as sexual
strategies or romantic manoeuvres, but rather in
dialectic.
Thus the true 'art of love' is
philosophy· and Plato devotes a great deal of
these three dialogues to making this claim. In so
doing he subverts the then prevalent Athenian
practice of paiderastia - the socially sanctioned
sexual rdationship between older men and
young teenaged boys through which youths were
supposed to leam virtue.
The history and social role of Athenian
Paiderastia is a complex story and far too
involved for my present purposes; however we
should note that it was commonly understood to
include at least two kinds of love: heavenly,
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol20/iss1/7
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Uranian love whose object is the soul, and
whose goal is the inculcation of virtue in the
beloved; and common or Pandemotic love,
whose object is the body and whose aim is mere
sexual pleasure (Symposium180c-e). Heavenly
love is solely homosexual since not only does it
take the Goddess Urania (whose descent is
always male) as its model but also because in
such a relationship the possibility of lustful
procreation is absent. 7 In the dialogues we are
considering, Plato makes Socrates the agent of
subversion, 8 or more accurately submersion of
Pandemotic by Uranian love. The goal of love
is, for Socrates, philosophical intercourse - the
dialectical questioning which is key to
apprehension of the form of the Good. So in the
Lysis we see Socrates teach by example. He
questions Lysis himself on the nature of
friendship.
These mock dialogues (ersatz
because even more so than in other dialogues the
interlocutor is turned into a Socratic yes-man)
are set pieces or examples of the kind of
dialectic required to do philosophy: they pose
analytic questions conceming the nature of
friendship per se in order slowly to winnow out
mistaken and contradictory views. For instance,
is the friend the lover or the beloved? Does
friendship inhere in a relationship between like
or unlike people? And what is the true basis of
friendship, that is, what is it in the friend that is
loved and thus makes them a friend? It is. only
through such sustained dialectic that a true
understanding of the subject of friendship can be
had and, correspondingly, the nature of love is
only grasped through the self-same form of
philosophy. The true artist of love, then, must
be first the lover of wisdom, for only through
elenchus can one come to know what love is to
begin with. Conversely, and with respect to the
- Good, knowledge of the good can only come
from proper practice of love of the good, which
turns out to be philosophy.
This point is made most forcefully in the
Symposium, Plato's dramatic masterpiece on the
nature of love. Socrates' speech in this dialogue
comes in the form of the recounted wisdom of
Diotima of Mantin~a, a woman whom Socrates
credits as teaching him the art of love.
According to Diotima, what we all love is the
good, that is we all want for ourselves what is
good and lasts forever. Alas, being mortals, this
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is not our natural gift and the best we can do to
satisfy our desire is to reproduce ourselves in an
endless cycle thus "giving birth in beauty
whether in body or soul" (Symposium 206b).
Again there are two forms of love being referred
to here: to give birth in beauty through the body
is natural to heterosexual love, for through
procreation parents give birth to children who
resemble them and so share in their beauty.
However the second form, homosexual love, (as
idealised in Athenian paiderastia) gives birth to
accounts of "wisdom and the rest of virtue"
(209b). It is through this kind of love that
dialectic flows towards its end III the
apprehension of the Good. Moreover Diotima
argues that the accounts of virtue spawned by
paiderastic love are protected from falling into
mere narcissism or vulgar physicality because of
the elenctic nature of dialectic itself. The
characteristic quality of dialectic is to question
critically: what we would now refer to as the
hermeneutics of suspicion. Diotima maintains
that this quality of dialectic provides it a
fundamental opemless to the world which
guarantees it safety from· the crass or tawdry
and, rather, propels the artful lover to beautiful
accounts of virtue of a particular sort: those
which can be used "in the proper ordering of
cities and households" (209a), "which make
young men better" (21 Oc) and "produce theories
in unstinting love of wisdom" (philosophia)
(210d). Diotima teaches that to love well is not.
to pursue the beloved in myriad ways (the
subject which engaged Socrates' interlocutors)
but rather to love a different beloved. Diotima
bids us love the fonn of beauty inherent in
created beautiful instantiations. This does not
mean that we give up on the object of our
affections in pursuit of some higher form of love
but rather that we see our natural beloved as but
one form of the beautiful, and that it is the Form
of beauty within our lover which is the real
pnze.
It is with the introduction of Platonic Fonns
that we can finally tackle the question of love of
God. It is no simplistic substitution to suggest
that for Plato love of God is simply love of the
Good. The Gods in Platonic dialogues rarely
stand for themselves, so when Socrates speaks,
for instance, of the Goddess of love in her two
forms (Urania and Pandemos) acting in certain
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ways, he is really talking about humans acting
according to love of the soul or love of the body.
Love of God therefore must for Plato mean love
of the triumvirate of the forms of Goodness,
Beauty and Truth, and this, as \\:,e have seen
from the Lysis pnd Symposium, is had through
proper practice of the art of love, that is
philosophy. Loving God in the appropriate way,
that is a way which subverts and subsumes the
ideals of Athenian pederasty such that through
elenchus we see the Forms inherent in the
beloved, results' in wisdom. But with this we
should not assume that it is cold~blooded
analysis to which we are being called .. The very
fact that dialectic is understood as the art of love
indicates that Plato's concern is for a
fundamental openness to the world, an openness
which excludes the merely rational in favour of
a more holistic engagement with wisdom.
Elenchtis is no mere science, not a mechanical
application of critical tools to the object at hand,
but rather a kind of phronesis or craft such that
its proper practice is the result of imagination as
well as analysis. The art of love as philosophia .
is a negotiation from what is known into what is
unknown and this requires a continuing
openness to the revelation of the Good inherent
in the world. Thus Plato's legacy for our
understanding of the love of God and loving
God is that we realise the immanence of God's
love in the world and through the process of
elenchus reveal the essential form of God's love
within the beloved.
This legacy is, of course, taken up in
various ways in Christian history and before we
move to look at Leibniz we should briefly veer
towards the neo-platonic version of the love of
God.
Plato's Forms inherent in the world are
given structure in Plotinus's depiction of the
emanation of creation from the One. The One is
identified with the Form of the Good by Plotinus
and stands below or supports Being itself. 9 It is
thus understood as constant and undiminished
becoming and, as pure becoming, as the
'thrown-ness' of Dasein in Heidegger's
terminology, the One manifests the fundamental
openness to the world which Plato was at pains
to ensure through elenchus. Thus Plotinus, in
rolling the Fonns into the ontological reality
from which all else ensues, naturalises and
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reifies elenctic openness to being. Moreover
the particular way in which the One is identified
with the fonn of the Good prepares the way for
later Christians to identify the One with the
logos, that is the rational Trinitarian counterpart
to Platonic dialectic. If Plato tells us that the art
of love is philosophy and that the true artist sees
the form of Beauty in the beloved, Plotinus
allows for Christians the Form of the Good, the
True and the Beautiful to reside in. the One
Christian godhead, known through Logos, itself
incarnated to redeem creation. It is rather an
elegant and fortuitous .piece of philosophy since
it allows for the Christianisation of Plato's
Forms in the concept of God and the valorisation
of the elenchus in the form of the immanent
logos. This immanence must now be carried to
its logical end through a consideration of
Leibniz.
God in Leibniz's world is the perfect
monad. In his Monadology he characterises the
universe as composed of. monads which are
immaterial, simple substances. (Monadology
§l-IO)IO We are all, despite apparent sensory
evidence to the contrary, simple, immaterial
substances. The way we happen to look turns.
out to be nothing more than 'WFP' (well
founded phenomena), but in substance we are
the same as God, the difference being merely in
degree of perfection and knowledge (what
Leibniz would classify together in terms of
predicates). God is for Leibniz quintessentially
the perfect being and creator of the universe.
These are, as it were, the non-negotiable axioms
at the heart of his theology. As a perfect,
necessary being, God lacks' nothing yet creates
the world out of itself without resultant
diminishment. There is here more than a hint of
Plotinus' One, in which Leibniz showed much
interest. II The key aspect for our purposes is
Leibniz's foundation of divine immanence in
creation. God and world are intimately related
since they are both fundamentally the same,
simple, monadic substance, the differentiation
between them obtaining through their relations
to all others. These interrelationships Leibniz
calls perceptions since they do not entail
external causation - monads are famously
'windowless'- however they are not sensory but
rather logical.
All monads, divine and
otherwise, are interrelated in a system of logical
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol20/iss1/7
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necessities governed by the law of sufficient
reason whereby each monad is determined to be
created as it is (with its particular predicates and
relations) and not in some other way. 12 We are
all thus interconnected in a web confonning to a
necessary pre-established harmony. For Leibniz
this harmony' is tantamount to the logos, the
essential rationality of God's creation through
and for which God is ultimately to be loved.
Now the web of perceptions which
connects all things and by which we know the
universe and God is understood by us through
what Leibniz calls apperception: equivalent to
conscious .self-reflection. (Monadology § 15)
The art of love practiced as philosophy is for
Leibniz thus found through our reflective
rational apperception, that is, reflection on the
necessary interrelations between all monads. So
where Plato argued that love of God/Good
amounts to philosophical pursuit of the Beautiful
as instantiated in beautiful things (thUS wisdom
arises from love), and Plotinus reifies the Forms
such that the One gives rise to the Forms now
immanent in creation and known through the
logos (thUS knowledge of God arises from
wisdom), Leibniz disperses the essential nature
of the one, perfect, creator God into all monads
so as to establish the immanent Forms in
substantial reality (thUS unity arises from
knowledge of God).
Moreover mutual
perception of monads of each other as well as
their own self, apperceptive, consciousness
conforms to the supremely rational preestablished
harmony
maintaining
the
relationships between monads.
When we
properly understand our connections to all
monads and to God, we come to proper
understanding of the nature of our true selves as
substantially identical to God. For Leibniz
therefore, true love of God can only come from
a rational understanding of the perfection of his
creation, organised before all time, to account
for not only the initial state of every monad in
existence but also all of their continuing changes
and redescribed relations. The love of God can
only spring from such an appreciation and
awareness of God's necessary perfection and of
creation arising from it.
For Leibniz this rational reflection - which
is indeed our only true activity since no monad
causally acts on any other in an external sense -
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is a means by which we are made more perfect.
I have already noted that for· Leibniz the
essential characteristic of God is that it is the one
perfect being, everything else is a limited
reflection of God in so far as we are not aware of
all of the various perceptual links between us
and everything else - only God knows this - but
through apperceptive reflection we are able to
discover at least some part o(this and thus grow
in our own perfection. The love of God, for
Leibniz, springs from this growth in perfection,
for as we more and more resemble God in the
self knowledge of our accidental attributes, the
more we take on the corollary knowledge and
activity of God, namely the care for others and
the desire for their perfection. Leibniz holds that
God's love for us is his pleasure in our
perfection, (Monadology §83-85) echoing the
commitment to the world which for Plato and
Plotinus was revelatory of the Forms. For
Leibniz what is revealed is not the inherent
beauty residing in the beloved, but rather the
awareness of its growing ontological actuality
and excellence. For Leibniz the attraction to our
beloved is the necessary result of greater
understanding of the true nature of reality. Love
issues from wisdom which is knowledge of
unity.
I have now very briefly considered how
Plato and Leibniz considered what it means to
love God. For Plato love of God turns out to be
equivalent to philosophy, and wisdom its result,
whereas for Leibniz love of God only ensues
from the cultivation of rational understanding
and ·the growth of wisdom.
What needs
consideration now is how these two opposites
might be redeemed through the notion of unity.
However for both Leibniz and Plato this unity
obscures the issue of imperfection. For Plato
love of God/Good is possible only when
material nature is transcended and for Leibniz,
who posits this unity through our shared
monadic substance with God, absolute unity is
denied though our contingently created natures.
No matter how far one delves into substantial
unity one cannot escape the imperfection of
created monads. How our authors deal with the
problem of imperfection (seen in Christian terms
as the problem of Theodicy) is beyond the scope
of this discussion. However one promising
avenue of research might be through
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Ramanuja's more robust conception of unity in
difference within his doctrine of the Universe as
the body of God. This task must, however, be
left to my fellow contributors and respondents.

Notes
1 To put it another way, was the pop music producer
Phil Spector correct when he wrote 'to know, know,
know him is to love, love, love him' (a song
ilmnortalised in 1958 by 'The Teddy Bears' and
covered many times since) or is Plato right when he
argues in three of his Socratic dialogues that
knowledge of the good flows from love of the goodthat is wisdom flows from union?
2 See particularly sections X: 24-30.
Augustine,
Confessions.
Trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin (London:
Penguin Classics, 1961), pp. 230-32.
3 Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Ephesians IX.
Trans. Roberts-Donaldson.
Christian Classics
Ethereal Library, (http://www .ccel.org/fathers21ANF0IlanfD1-16.htm#PI214 224344).
4 Encyclical letter, Deus Caritas Est, of the Supreme
Pontiff Benedict XVI to the Bishops, Priests, and
Deacons, Men and Women Religious and all the lay
faithful On Christian Love, Dec 252005.
5 The extent of Leibniz's faithful practice of
Christianity is put into doubt in Matthew Stewart's
intriguing text The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz,
Spinoza and the Fate of God, (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2005).
6
Or more precisely that his wisdom is worthless.
Apology 21d - 24b. All references are to the Hacket
edition of Plato, Complete Works. Ed. John M.
Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997) unless
otherwise stated.
7 The creation of Urania was not through sexual
procreation but rather castration.' See Hesiod's
Theog011Y
II:
176-206.
(http://www.sacredtexts.comlcla/hesiodl theogoI1y.htm)
8 We see this subversion in the Symposium where
Alcibiades relates at length how his love for
Socrates' remarkable gifts of dialectic turned the
normally pursued youth into the pursuer, contrary to
the norms of paiderastia.
9 See Terrence Irwin, Classical Thought (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), p.l86.
10 References to Leibniz's Monadology are from
Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics and other essays
(Indianapolis Indiana: Hackett, 1991)
11 The One emanates all things from itself without
diminishment. Terrence Irwin, Classical Thought
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.194.
12 The principle of sufficient reason is for Leibniz the
logical counterpart to that which detennines a thing
to be itself and not something else.
Leibniz
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understood this to be a necessary truth of a rational
created order. (Monadology §32).
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